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At a UK conference back in 2010 one of us was standing with two colleagues whose work, like 
ours, takes inspiration from Michel Foucault, talking about the upcoming International Studies 
Association (ISA) conference in the US.1 Somehow the conversation turned to how a lot of 
people are concerned about the impact that inter-continental flights have on our climate, and 
how European International Relations (IR) scholars allegedly contribute to detrimental climate 
change by always having to travel to North America for their major annual international 
conference. ‘Ah well, it’s all about the politics of catastrophe, isn’t it’ said one colleague 
mockingly. Everyone laughed at this remark, which implicitly referred to the research on 
notions of catastrophe that many of our colleagues are involved in. Much of this research is very 
critical of the idea of environmental ‘catastrophe’, which, it is suggested, occludes the existence 
of internal, structural societal problems (such as inequality and exploitation) by shifting our 
focus to ‘external’ ones (such as climate change).  
 
Yet the conversation was also unsettling. Being what one might want to call 
‘environmentalists’, concerns about climate change bother us, and we have therefore attempted 
to limit flying to some degree.  We have a lot of respect for colleagues and friends who – for 
this very reason – are willing to undertake long train and boat journeys to avoid flying when 
travelling across Europe for work. The way the conversation took for granted ‘our’ 
(‘Foucauldian’) consensus about the need to dismiss, or at least critique, this environmental 
commitment was for us a source of disquiet. Whose political argument does such consensus 
supports and whose political struggle does it eliminate? As Bruno Latour (2004, 231) remarked 
over a decade ago, the notion of critique that comes to the fore here attracts strange bedfellows, 
for whom it is a welcome resource in their fight against those who stress that we have an 
environmental problem. Indeed, right-wing climate change deniers might find this critique 
useful in gathering support for their commitment to the continuation of ‘business as usual’, to a 
politics that embraces continuous economic growth and the need for a ‘small’ non-
interventionist state determined to abandon even the most vulnerable to brutal market forces.  
 
A predominant strand of the ‘politics of catastrophe’ argument, inspired as it is by Foucault’s 
critique of supposedly ‘objective’ scientific knowledge, cautions us against reliance upon 
science for political decisions – a reliance that can marginalise those voices emphasising the 
need for a radical internal economic and political restructuring of society. In relation to 
environmental problems, it is argued that a science-based approach pushes forward the need for 
either technocratic regulation (de Goede and Randalls 2009) or neoliberal policies that advocate 
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the need to adapt to (instead of combatting) forces of nature by bolstering societal ‘resilience’ 
(Cooper 2010).  Latour is usually taken to be at the forefront of efforts to unravel the objectivity 
of scientific knowledge and to highlight its historical contingency. In the text mentioned above, 
however, Latour (2004, 232) urges us to contemplate whether a critique that is based on the 
continuous questioning of scientific truth-claims is still up to the job if the same logic is used by 
those it so firmly sets out to oppose – if it is ‘encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and … 
to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies’. What does it mean, Latour (2004, 227) 
asks, ‘when [the] lack of sure ground is taken away from us by the worst possible fellows as an 
argument against the things we cherish?’  
 
There is, nonetheless, no question that much of the critique to be found in the ‘politics of 
catastrophe’ research is not only valid, but also politically significant. Just consider the 
following statement, which was made by direct action group Plane Stupid’s member, Joss 
Garman: 
 
[T]his isn’t about ideals so much as hard science…We know how this story ends, 
but not because we’ve read obscure economic treaties or dense theories from 
Friedman and Hayek, or Hobsbawm and Marx. We know because scientists are 
providing measurable objective evidence that he high-carbon economic model has 
an in-built self-destruct mechanism. (Garman 2009; our emphasis; cf. 
Schlembach, Lear and Bowman 2012, 818) 
 
This quote shows how, for many activists, the problem of climate change has more to do with a 
proper comprehension of ‘hard science’ than with an overall diagnosis of societal wrongs and 
all-encompassing visions for the world as such. It indeed illustrates a lack of desire to globally 
restructure ‘the entire social space’ that we inhabit (Žižek 1999, 208). Moreover, what is 
critiqued in the ‘politics of catastrophe’ research is not environmental activism per se, but a 
particular environmental approach, which is embraced by Western governments and 
international institutions, an approach that often complies with paradigms such as ecological 
modernisation, sustainable development and green growth, and that stands in ‘historical tension’ 
with more radical environmental Marxist and anarcho-autonomist branches (Reitan and Gibson 
2012, 396-7).  
 
But our discomfort arises from the problem that this, justified, critique of scientific knowledge 
too often slips into an outright, binary dismissal of any political argument that is based on a 
potentially ‘apocalyptic’ discourse. The statement below from Michael Hardt illustrates this 
problem well: 
 
Anticapitalist movements are apocalyptic in the long tradition of millenarian and 
revolutionary groups that struggle to precipitate an event of radical transformation. 
The end of the days is the beginning of a new world. The apocalyptic imagination 
of climate change movements, by contrast, sees radical change as final 
catastrophe. (Hardt 2010, 273; our emphasis) 
 
Hardt’s critique of climate change movements is based on an either…or standpoint: if a 
movement is anticapitalist, it cannot be ‘apocalyptic’ in the sense of ‘final catastrophe’. As we 
will show in the next section of this chapter, the same tendency can be found – albeit implicitly 
– in the ‘politics of catastrophe’ literature, particularly the strand that draws on Foucault’s 
concept of ‘biopolitics’: if science is used to justify particular ‘neoliberal’ policies, it seems to 
have become useless for combatting other (potentially equally neoliberal) policies. If 
apocalyptic imaginaries feed into technocratic governmental regulation, they apparently have to 
be discarded as basis for radical critique. Thus, if environmental activism uses this discourse, it 
only serves the system instead of challenging it. What interests us in this chapter is how certain 
political struggles are rendered invisible by this kind of approach. If scientific ‘truths’ about 
climate change are conceived as feeding straightforwardly into (neo)liberal regimes, the 
ongoing political struggle over the question of how ‘true’ the charge of human-made climate 
change actually is can no longer be acknowledged. In what follows, we challenge this 
understanding and develop an alternative approach, one able to go beyond binaries and 
appreciate the differentiated nature and politics of resistance – an approach that begins with the 
struggles themselves.  
Biopolitics, Binary Logics, and Environmental Activism 
Much of the ‘politics of catastrophe’ literature is linked to Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. 
Inspired by Foucault’s exposition of a biopolitical governance of populations, reliant upon 
knowledge taken from the human sciences, several scholars have argued that the invocation of 
looming environmental catastrophe buys into the objectives of (neo)liberal biopolitical regimes, 
which foster and contain the life of populations at the expense of more radical politics. In this 
spirit, Julian Reid (2012, 69), for example, argues that a majority of environmentalists fail to 
recognise that contemporary biopolitical rationalities are based on ‘ecological reasoning’, which 
accordingly can no longer be considered a straightforward means of contestation. Indeed, he 
points out that environmental activists are profoundly mistaken when thinking that our 
contemporary governmental regimes do not show sufficient concern for the natural world, and 
that they ignore human vulnerability. On the contrary, Reid (2012, 69) suggests that governance 
today is all about our vulnerability to nature and other external forces (such as terrorism), 
which, we are told, can neither be predicted nor controlled, and to which adaptation and 
becoming resilient is conceived as the only viable response (cf. Chandler 2012; Evans and Reid 
2013, 2014). Instead of not recognising how ecological systems work, Reid (2012, 68-9, 77) 
maintains that contemporary governmental systems have understood this far too well: they have 
made it part and parcel of the neoliberal logic of self-reliance and responsibility. Among other 
things, Reid (2013) pertinently elucidates the consequences of such an understanding for the 
global poor in relation to development politics: sustainable development has given up the 
objective of ‘securing’ populations by preventing disasters and closing the gaps between North 
and South. Instead, development discourse promotes a notion of self-reliance that abandons the 
poor to ‘natural’ forces in the name of resilience. 
 
Many biopolitics scholars trace this neoliberal logic back to new developments in science, 
particularly complexity and network science (Dillon and Reid 2009; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 
2009; Duffield 2011a, 2011b). Those scholars who locate their work within ‘security studies’ 
argue, for example, that these scientific developments have fundamentally transformed 
governmental understandings of what ‘national security’ is about and how it should be 
achieved. While previously security was all about the predictability and consequent prevention 
of threats, complexity science has, it is maintained, introduced security regimes to a notion of 
life characterised by uncertainty and unpredictability. This means that the (biopolitical) aim of 
these regimes is nowadays to enhance the capacity of a population to ‘bounce back’ from 
catastrophic events (e.g. a terrorist attack, a hurricane, or a famine), accepting the fact that 
some, or even many, will be left to die. The implied focus on the survival of the population 
instead of the individual seems to represent biopolitical governance par excellence. Moreover, 
as Melinda Cooper (2010, 184) points out, it also serves and consolidates imperialist strategies: 
‘what matters [now] is whether the accidental event of turbulence can be harnessed to the 
strategic ends of sustaining the US-dollar denominated world’. This is an important argument, 
and Cooper’s (2010) meticulous report of how the reality of climate change ‘turbulences’ have 
been slowly becoming accepted knowledge in US ‘grand strategy’ scenario planning is as 
devastating as it is convincing. The problem, however, emerges in relation to Cooper’s overall 
conclusion when she maintains that this new way of strategising now represents US neoliberal 
imperialism per se. A similar tendency underlies Mark Duffield’s (2011b) suggestion that 
global neoliberal domination as such now rests on the (complexity, science-based) imaginary 
that the world is ‘a purposefully interconnected system’. This kind of thinking, which is again to 
be found in much of environmental activism, should be, according to Duffield, the principal 
enemy for critical theory. Like Cooper, Duffield frames one particular imaginary as 
representative of world hegemony as such.  Resistance thus has to take the form of binary 
opposition to this imaginary. But what kind of political struggles are rendered invisible if 
Duffield (2011b) maintains that the greatest problem that the globe faces today is the 
‘imaginary’ of a complex world threatened by ‘dangerous climate change’? His argument 
testifies to the great amount of certainty that we can find in some of the biopolitics literature 
when it comes to identifying the (absolute, singular) problem that needs to be challenged by 
critical theorists.  
 
This certainty and conviction occludes how theorists themselves contribute to setting up 
particular problematics, a move that renders certain elements visible while it (necessarily) elides 
others. Lara Montesinos Coleman and Hannah Hughes (2015) have explored the implications of 
how the framing of problems is influenced by the taken for granted objects of study offered up 
to us by academic fields of study (Coleman and Hughes 2015, 143; Coleman 2015b). The 
‘field’ of security studies, for example, exercises a ‘force on our thinking’ (Coleman and 
Hughes 2015, 143), resulting in a privileging of the concept of ‘security’ against which all 
governmental and resisting practices are read. Moreover, in the ‘biopolitics of security’ 
approaches, ‘biopolitics’ has been transformed into a sort of sociology or theory of society that 
is used to characterise contemporary global (neo)liberal order and domination as such (Coleman 
and Hughes 2015, 147; Coleman and Rosenow 2016). The tendency to ‘sociologise’ Foucault 
runs very much counter to Foucault’s own philosophical project and the way in which Foucault 
developed his concepts in the context of very specific problems (Coleman and Hughes 2015, 
147-9; Debrix 2010; Veyne 1997). ‘Biopolitics’, for Foucault (e.g. 2003, 239; 2007, 30-32; 
2008, 65), is not the cornerstone of a theory of liberal rule but developed, in slightly different 
directions at different moments, to make sense of certain family resemblances between 
nonetheless heterogeneous approaches to the population as an aggregate entity in Europe from 
the eighteenth century onwards – in the context of diverse problems such as war, food scarcity, 
public health concerns, or the need for a politically docile labour supply. Foucault’s work has 
increasingly been used to theorise ‘global’ power in such an exhaustive manner that the 
complex and diverse interplay between strategies of world-ordering and expressions of political 
struggle has been made less visible (cf. Coleman and Hughes 2015, 144). Instead, resistance to 
biopolitics becomes visible at an equally all-encompassing level – it is supposedly found in the 
‘excess of being’ that cannot be scientifically comprehended and classified (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero 2009, 5), in a notion of ‘the human’ that understands it as ‘singular’ rather than as part 
of a ‘species’, or in the incorporeal political subject (Reid 2012, 78; cf. Evans and Reid 2014).  
For the biopolitics of resilience literature, any political struggle that make use of a ‘corporeal’, 
science-based discourse – as much of environmental activism does – is dismissed wholesale, 
while other practices of resistance, which do not fit within this binary logic, are simply 
invisible. 
 
Many of the aforementioned scholars of biopolitics claim to be doing ‘genealogical’ analyses of 
political practices. Yet, for Foucault (1977, 139), the objective of genealogy is precisely to 
contest monolithic readings of history. It aims to cut history into ‘events’ that pay tribute to 
their ‘singularity…outside of any monotonous finality’. In other words, it is important to 
recognise that the development of history can never be grasped with all-encompassing, 
homogeneous, finite theorems.2 Moreover, in Society Must Be Defended Foucault (2003, 7) is 
keen to emphasise that the development of historical truth regimes is subject to constant 
struggles; characterised by the ‘insurrection’ and elimination of other types of knowledge, 
which should become the object of genealogical rediscovery. As William Walters (2012, 132, 
134) notes, this understanding of ‘genealogy as struggle’ is still ‘somewhat rare’.3 Instead of 
focusing on actually-existing struggles of knowledge, the literature referred to above has 
rendered (global) power and politics theoretically saturated and monolithic, and has thereby 
contributed to rendering invisible the battles for ‘truth’ that do not fit into the pre-fixed 
theoretical schemas mapped out (Coleman and Rosenow forthcoming). 
 
Our aim in this chapter is to formulate a different approach, one that does not start with the 
‘biopolitical question’, but with a foregrounding of struggle (see Coleman 2015b; Coleman and 
Rosenow 2016; forthcoming). However, the mere genealogical (re-)turn to forgotten or 
neglected battles of truth is not sufficient. Walters (2012, 132, 134) uses the term ‘genealogy as 
struggle’, in contrast to mere ‘genealogy of struggle’, precisely in order to indicate the need for 
a more politicised understanding of, or indeed engagement in, the struggles that we (re)discover 
(Coleman 2015a; 2015b; Coleman and Rosenow 2016; forthcoming).. This is what Thomas 
Biebricher (2008, 366), also drawing on Foucault’s understanding of genealogy in Society Must 
Be Defended, calls a ‘self-consciously partisan perspective’ of the genealogist that leads her/him 
to write the chronicles of political struggles in order to incite contestation.4  
 
The desire for a more partisan perspective on struggles is related to the (political) discomfort 
that we have outlined in relation to the sort of consensual laughter related in the anecdote with 
which we started this chapter. At first glance, Latour’s distinction between ‘matters of fact’ and 
‘matters of concern’ resonates with this, as it indicates the need to reflect on what ‘concerns’ are 
driving our critique. However, Latour (2004, 229), in a move that he describes as ‘stubborn 
realism’, aims to turn towards a concern with ‘things’, contemplating their agency, and the need 
to transform ‘objects’ (e.g. nature) into such ‘things’. Despite a degree of sympathy with such a 
move (cf. Coleman 2015b), we want to focus here on a different aspect of efforts to gain 
distance from apparently obvious objects and frames. Our concern here is that there is just as 
much need to (re-) turn to the political concerns of the self engaged in research as there is a need 
to turn towards the concerns of things. Indeed, the two are inseparable. It is a politically 
                                                      
2 It is interesting how close some of the biopolitics literature stays to Foucault’s archaeological project that, in contrast 
to his genealogies, sticks to the (Kantian) idea of necessity and systematicity when trying to uncover the general 
conditions for the possibility of knowledge in a given historical epoch. However, it needs to be acknowledged that 
genealogy often falls prey to the same problem. As we discuss in a forthcoming paper, it is unclear, for example, from 
which position Foucault can maintain – as he does in several places in Discipline and Punish (e.g. 1979, 28) and The 
History of Sexuality Volume 1 (e.g. 1998, 92) – that the power-knowledge nexus is a general feature of history insofar 
that it can take ‘different historical forms’ in different historical epochs (Han 2002, 143). Béatrice Han emphasises 
(2002, 143) that this ‘seems to reactivate the type of Hegelian schema so disliked by Foucault’, as the power-knowledge 
nexus is no longer ‘a contingent and historically given configuration’, but a ‘metaphysical entity, endowed with a quasi-
transcendental function’. 
3 Walters focuses upon how genealogy, as a method, has been in used in governmentality studies – but we contend that 
his diagnosis is adequate for the biopolitics literature as well. It needs to be emphasised though that apart from Society 
Must Be Defended, Foucault’s work itself does not pay much attention to these struggles. 
4 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Coleman and Rosenow forthcoming. 
embodied and engaged researcher who genealogically aims to make visible particular struggles, 
who actively contributes her-/himself to the constitution of what is perceived to be a ‘problem’ 
in the first place (Coleman 2015b). The researcher, as partisan, is willing to put her/his body on 
the (political) line, both literally and metaphorically, acting and theorising in solidarity with 
those whose struggles (s)he is committed to, rather than basing political judgments and 
suggestions on fixed theoretical schemes.  We (2016) have argued elsewhere, in line with 
William Connolly (1992, 146), that every analysis contains fundamental ontological 
‘presumptions’ about the world that cannot help but structure the frameworks within which 
analysis takes place. This brings to light a ‘paradoxical condition’ for the critical researcher, 
who always needs to move in-between critical analysis and what Connolly (1992, 145) calls 
‘projectional interpretation’, which implies that certain presumptions are intentionally projected 
into every interpretation. Engaging the politics of resistance requires, we argue, a particular sort 
of ontological investment, one shaped by engagement with complexes of power and domination 
that struggles expose and frame from diverse positions. Struggles against domination, including 
ecological domination, oppression, dispossession and so on, offer a privileged, albeit partial and 
perspectival, view on aspects of the constellations of power they are directed towards. We may 
think of them ‘as a baseline or conjecture’ permanently in question, in persistent interplay with 
the experience of repression, neutralisation, domestification or dismissal through ‘superior’ 
claims to scientific knowledge. We can acknowledge such interpretations as fictions – they 
make their objects of study through engagement, encounter and the attempt to manipulate the 
world – but that which they frame is no less real as a result (Coleman 2015b; Coleman and 
Rosenow forthcoming). This ‘back-and-forth’ (Coleman 2015b), or double move, between 
ontopolitical projection and critique enables us to overcome the dilemma of either having to 
privilege a genealogical or deconstructive practice of gaining distance that shies away from 
political judgments, on the one hand, and a constructive account that is based on abstract, binary 
accounts of problems and solutions, on the other. The next section will outline this argument in 
more detail while in the last section we will engage one particular case of ‘apocalyptic’ 
environmental activism. 
Beyond Ready-made Problems and Binary Solutions: Ontopolitics and Critique 
The tendency to fall back onto binary ways of thinking signals that many of the scholars 
discussed so far remain epistemologically stuck in what Connolly (1992, 131) has once called 
the ‘ontopolitical matrix of late-modern discourse’, a concept originally developed in reference 
to the frame within which most of the Anglo-American political theory was located in the early 
1990s. The matrix, for Connolly, contains two axes: the horizontal one defined by the opposing 
categories of mastery (referring to the desire for human control over nature) and attunement 
(professing the desire for living in harmony with nature) and the vertical one that outlines the 
primary constituent of responsibility and activity, oscillating between the poles of individual 
and collectivity (Connolly 1992, 131). Connolly (1992, 132) argues that mainstream political 
discourse is incapable of moving out of the matrix as such: if one of its central poles is 
questioned, the interrogator is automatically ‘drawn as if by a magnet’ towards one of the other 
ones. This happens due to the unacknowledged desire to compensate for long-gone enchanted 
understandings of the world – compensations that work either via mastery- or harmony-
fantasies, that insist on the need for discipline, organisation and regulation, and that avoid 
reflective self-problematisation that would open our disciplined selves to the experience of 
contingency (Connolly 1992, 133-5). 
 
At first glance, some of the critiques made in the biopolitics of security literature seem to 
resonate with Connolly’s argument, particularly the emphasis on resistance being found in a 
critique of scientific classification and organisation, in the non-measurable ‘excess’ of 
incorporeal existence (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 5; Reid 2012, 78). However, some of 
what is suggested as political alternatives makes clear that much of the discourse is still firmly 
located within this matrix, as will be shown in the following. If attunement (as the 
understanding of nature as external, harmonious and superior) is rejected, what is turned back to 
is the concept of mastery. If, as it is argued, uncertainty and contingency characterise 
contemporary governmental rationalities and regimes, it is certainty that we should strive for as 
an alternative. If it is not nature that knows best what needs to be done, then surely it must be 
the human subject. David Chandler, for example, whose argument is closely related to this 
literature5 sets out in firm contestation of any politics that invokes the concept of dangerous 
climate change, a critique he targets in particular at proponents of complexity science. Chandler 
(2013, 518) maintains that human freedom is only conceivable within ‘the structures of laws of 
necessity’. The only (and unacceptable) alternative, for Chandler, is ‘enslavement…to the 
arbitrary and unknowable whims of blind necessity’. Indeed, Chandler exercises what Connolly 
calls the ‘magnet-move’ of the matrix par excellence, being drawn automatically to the 
opposing pole, as the following statement illustrates:  
 
The argument is straightforward: if there is no longer necessity – no laws and 
regularities operating both in ‘nature’ and through social relations – then there can 
be no meaningfulness in the world and we would be entirely subject to what 
appear to us as external processes. Objects really would literally appear to rule 
over us […] (Chandler 2013, 519) 
 
Now why this is the case, why some kind of ‘rule of objects’ is the only alternative, remains 
unclear: it seems that dismissing one pole of the matrix automatically implies an embrace of the 
other. The magnet lure of a binary argument can likewise be traced in Reid’s account. Reid 
(2011, 776; our emphasis) explicitly calls for the rediscovery of ‘the hubristic dimension of the 
subject’, which ‘acts against the monarchy of life, challenging the subject’s reduction to a status 
of dependency on things outside the self, sacrificing that on which he or she has hitherto 
depended, taking what he or she wants, and celebrating autonomy.’ In a similar vein, Brad 
Evans argues, together with Reid (2013, 85), for the need to conceptualise a subject that ‘can 
conceive of changing the world, its structures and conditions of possibility’ versus a ‘resilient 
subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world’. This invocation 
of the political (vs. the resilient) subject is deeply problematic. It speaks to the wish to base 
meaningful politics on the conceptualisation of a subject that is able to shape its environment in 
accordance with its desires, a subject not paralysed by an externality beyond its control, but who 
regains power by taking things into her/his own hands, in other words, by the explicit wish for 
and the fantasy of mastery that emerges from a binary either…or understanding of critique.6 
Somehow surprisingly, this argument resonates with certain Marxists understandings of the 
world, which have long been subject to critique from within the Marxist tradition. As David 
                                                      
5 Chandler’s argument is related when it comes to diagnosing contemporary politics as being shaped by complexity 
science and the rationality of ‘resilience’. However, Chandler does not draw on Foucault – indeed, he is very critical of 
the biopolitics literature in other respects (see e.g. 2009, 2010). 
6 It should be added that this hubristic understanding of the subject also reflects worryingly masculinist onto-
epistemologies. Reid’s (2011) critique of Judith Butler’s ethical ontology of vulnerability, for example, not only 
invokes a binary logic (according to which any attachment to vulnerability is automatically discounted as complicit with 
contemporary liberal regimes). It also disregards a long history of feminist critique based upon experiences (of 
contingency, connectivity, and vulnerability that go along for example with pregnancy and childbirth – see e.g. Di 
Stefano 1990), which are also disavowed by the centring of the hubristic subject. 
Harvey (1998, 327; our emphasis) points out, these understandings are characterised by a 
‘strongly productivist ethic’ and an ‘instrumental approach’ that Marxism has ‘inherited from 
capitalism’. Harvey emphasises how hard it has been ‘to wean Marxism away from a rather 
hubristic view of the domination of nature thesis’. 
 
The move to the opposite side of the horizontal matrix – attunement with nature – deserves to 
be mentioned as well, despite not being a feature of the biopolitics literature. Harvey (1998, 
328; our emphasis) astutely puts his finger on the problem of attunement in environmentalism 
when arguing that ‘the postulation of a planetary ecological crisis, the very idea that the planet 
is somehow “vulnerable” to human action, repeat in a negative form the hubristic claims of 
those who aspire to planetary domination.’ The main problem of the attunement-claim is the 
notion that humanity as such is a source of negative disturbance to an otherwise harmoniously 
operating ‘Mother Nature’. In this conceptualisation, ‘humanity’ and ‘nature’ exist in a 
dichotomy, whose gendered undertones should not go unnoticed.  Historically, this has implied 
the spread of a resoundingly colonial logic of conservation that has led to the dispossession of 
people considered a ‘disturbance’.  One example is the constitution of the Nagarhole National 
Park in southern Karnataka/India, which was set up as a reservoir for tigers. Influenced by a 
‘biocentric’ perspective that regards human presence per se as a problem, John G. Robinson 
from the Wildlife Conservation Society in New York argued for the removal of about 6,000 
tribals in the area: ‘Relocating tribal or traditional people who live in…protected areas is the 
single most important step towards conservation’, he maintained, because tribes ‘compulsively 
hunt for food’, which means that tigers cannot compete with them for prey (quoted in Guha and 
Alier 1997, 106). Environmental movements themselves are far from immune from 
incorporation into this frame – indeed, given our emphasis on engagement and commitment, we 
should underscore at this point that commitment and solidarity do not imply an automatic 
embrace of existing activist frames, but that they also require some critical distance (Coleman 
2015b; see also Hale 2011; Routledge 1996). To simply adopt this conversationist rhetoric 
would not provide a way out of the matrix, but merely reverse the move between the two poles. 
 
If we are to find a way out of the ontopolitical matrix, we need to return to the question of 
critique.  As mentioned before, Connolly considers this matrix to be an effect, among other 
things, of a lack of reflective self-problematisation. It is this element that leads us back to 
emphasise an understanding of analysis and critique that reflects explicitly on the role of the 
critical theorist who enables a certain problem – or political struggle – to be perceived as such 
in the first place, at the expense of other, potentially equally relevant, or even more important 
problems and struggles. To be sure, most theorists who draw on Foucault emphasise the need 
for self-transformation and -creativity, but often – as Coleman and Hughes discuss (2015, 147) 
– this does not include a reflection on their own role as ‘problematisers’ and the politics at play 
in the moves by which we make certain elements visible and occlude others. Despite Foucault’s 
strong emphasis on the ‘contingency’ of the self, those who aim to follow in his footsteps seem 
to be unwilling to question the certainty of their problems and, by implication, the certainty of 
their own self-positioning (see also Coleman 2015b). Diverging from Connolly, this work of 
critical self-reflection should not be reduced to mere reflexivity, which would imply a 
distinction between subject and object. Instead, we need to think through and in relation to 
practical engagement and encounter in struggles, which can – as we discuss below – force us to 
risk ourselves as subjects within the practicee of truth-telling (Coleman 2015b). 
 
For Connolly, the certainty of the problem is questionable precisely because its definition and 
identification is always based on particular – and to a certain extent contingent – ontopolitical 
commitments that come from the self as a knowing subject (cf. Coleman and Rosenow 2016). 
He thereby does not confine the concept of ontopolitics to the arena of the conventional matrix, 
but argues that no political analysis or critique, no matter how ‘historical’, ‘genealogical’, or 
‘deconstructive’ it may claim to be, can do without particular pre-analytical commitments. No 
problem is ever simply given. Insead, it can only become visible within a particular framework 
that ‘establish[es] the possibilities within which its assessment of actuality is presented, delimits 
its distribution of explanatory elements, generates parameters within which its ethic is 
elaborated, and centers (or decenters) its assessments of responsibility’ (Connolly 1992, 119). 
Foucault himself recognised this to a certain extent: he is very clear that genealogy is an 
interpretation of historical events that does not claim to be any ‘truer’ than those interpretations 
it sets out to contest – it is always a ‘fiction’, with ‘the only possible truth’ consisting in ‘not 
disguising the “fictive” or “fictionalizing” nature of [this] enterprise’, and thereby fighting 
against dominant, truthful interpretations (Han 2002, 102, referring to Foucault 1977). 
However, this argument harbours the dangers of circularity: it seems to rely on a pre-
genealogical understanding of what constitutes the dominant ‘truth’ in a given historical époque 
that struggles are up against – an understanding that genealogy is supposed to reveal in the first 
place! It does not sufficiently reflect on its own onto-assumptions in relation to the question of 
truth – as Connolly (1992, 143-5) maintains. Foucault himself too often proceeds as if the 
theories and frameworks to be deconstructed were only those of others. Probably out of a 
‘desire to minimize an implication in ontological assumptions it could never vindicate without 
drawing upon some of the same media it has just ambiguated’, Foucault, according to Connolly, 
remains overly silent on his own ontopolitical commitments.  
 
From the perspectival lens of engagement with struggle, outlined above, we contend that the 
very practice of truth-telling about general relations of power and forms of knowledge in need 
of contestation is actively constituted by an ontopolitically committed, embodied, partisan 
researcher (Coleman and Rosenow 2016). This researcher is in one respect immanent to the 
particular problems s/he sets out to investigate and engages within.  On the other hand, critique 
of ready-made frames, critical distance from both struggles themselves and available scholarly 
problematics constitute moments of transcendence, in which we risk ourselves as subjects at 
both ends (Coleman 2015b). It is from this perpetually dislocated position of 
immanence/transcendence that wider political alternatives are mapped out in the unstable space 
between attachment to and critical distance from struggles themselves. Although it does not 
emphasise struggle, Connolly’s move of ontopolitical projection also recognises how apparently 
transcendent claims about ontological ‘truth’ are grounded in political contingency and 
immanence. This means that commitment to political alternatives can never gain a totally secure 
status. From the perspective advanced here, moreover, the constructive element itself is 
transformable, informed dialectically by changing struggles, experiences of engagement and 
contexts of commitment (Coleman 2015b), which prevents it from merely moving between 
oppositional poles when diagnosing problems and putting forward responses.  
Finding Opposition in Struggles over Nature and Life 
In the following, the chapter will engage with some of the implications of this approach for the 
struggles of knowledge that can be found in environmental movements, based on the example 
of the debates about the benefits and ills of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The 
substantive research projects from which this chapter emerges have involved, for both of us, an 
element of partisan commitment and/or active engagement in a series of struggles: over the 
effects of oil exploration, agrofuel production and armed land concentration in Colombia (e.g. 
Coleman 2007; 2013; 2015a; 2015b; Aeberhard et al. 2007) and over GMOs in Europe and 
India (Rosenow 2009; 2012; 2013). However, talking about partisan commitment and 
engagements as having taken place ‘prior’ to critical analysis is in a sense misleading. 
Reflecting on the embodiment of researching selves implies that it is impossible to think about 
analysis in terms of ‘starting’ and ‘end-points’ (Coleman 2015b; Coleman and Rosenow 2016). 
There has never been a prior political commitment that has then led to a theoretical 
contemplation of the ills of biopolitical research, and then to the development of a framework 
ready to be ‘applied’ to a given case. An embodied and ontopolitically committed self is always 
already in the middle of the double move of analysis and projectional theoretical construction, 
or theoretically-informed engagement and critique of those very practices (Coleman and 
Rosenow 2016; Coleman 2015b). ‘Where/how to start’ becomes a superfluous question, 
because in reality all of us have already started somewhere. We are all already embodied, 
influenced by past research or political activities and experiences, by the practices we engage(d) 
with, or by our own political beliefs.   
 
We started our research journeys driven by particular political and ecological commitments that 
have put us in solidarity with those similarly committed and engaged in processess of 
resistance. At the same time, however, we have been influenced by reading the work of 
Foucault and other philosophers, such as Butler, Bachelard, Deleuze, Marx and others, as well 
as those scholars drawing on these traditions in our own academic fields. We have used 
concepts drawn from these thinkers but the active constitution of the problems identified, not 
only in this chapter, but also in the larger projects this chapter draws upon, has been taking 
place in the uncomfortable space in-between existing categories or concepts, in-between 
particular practices of struggle, and conscious, reflected, ontopolitical projection, which 
requires us to challenge, question and redefine ourselves within the practice of writing 
(Coleman 2015b; Coleman and Rosenow 2016).  
 
The debate around GMOs is, like the debate over climate change, another good example of the 
potential biopolitical corruption of environmental activism. As Eric Swyngedouw stresses 
(2007, 21), the anti-GMO argument strongly features a conception of nature as ‘packaged, 
numbered, calculated, coded, modeled, and represented by those who claim to possess, know, 
understand, and speak for the “real Nature’’’. However, in contrast to the climate change 
debate, in the GMO controversy the concept of ‘scientific consensus’ is not used in favour of 
environmentalism, but against it: the argument about calculability is used by those who argue in 
support of GMOs.  Meanwhile those (marginalised) scientists and activists who oppose genetic 
engineering (GE) use a different understanding of life and nature, one that questions the idea of 
calculable predictability and instead points to the uncertainty created by ‘meddling’ with nature. 
Contra the conviction of biopolitical theorists that neoliberalism is founded on an episteme 
emphasising the uncertainty and unpredictability of life, traditional modern epistemes are 
characterised by concepts of predictability where human control remains prevalent. The 
regulation of biotechnology is but one example (Rosenow 2009; 2012; Ansems de Vries and 
Rosenow 2015). At the peak of European anti-GMO activism – the late 1990s and early 2000s – 
some of the most outspoken anti-GMO activists were biologists who were keen to point out 
how the discipline of genetics has traditionally been based on the ‘gene-centric’ school of 
thought, which understands the world in Newtonian manner as existing in perfect equilibrium. 
Gene-centrism forwards the so-called ‘Central Dogma’ which argues that information about 
organic development irreversibly moves in a linear manner from gene to protein to final 
organism. This understanding relies on the possibility of distinguishing ontologically between 
information and its realisation or materialisation. According to Oyama (2000, 1), the notion of 
the ontological autonomy of information, located in the gene, resembles the theological notion 
of God as eternal, atemporal and intentional creator, which implies that the question of life is 
still asked with regard to its origin, no matter whether it is located in a causalistic God or in the 
gene as ‘Nature’s agent’. This is echoed by one of the best-known anti-GMO activists in the 
UK, Mae-Wan Ho, a critical biologist who argues that the entire Western worldview, which 
emphasises ‘the persistence of the eternal soul, or order and stability in the face of change’ (Ho 
1998, 72), is contained in the notion of what August Weismann originally called the ‘germ 
plasm’, and which is today understood as the ‘genetic code’. This notion assumes that 
biological heritage is contained and passed on unaltered through the generations. Otherwise, it 
would become difficult to explain how disorder (a ‘heap of chemicals’) could produce the 
ordered unity of being (Oyama 2000, 14). 
 
This understanding resonates resoundingly with the ideal of predictability and (self-)control. 
The stated aim is to get to know life as such and thereby oneself, with this knowledge being 
compressed so that it can be possessed and controlled by a (universal) subject. For a long time, 
biologists nurtured the dream of one day being able to put an individual’s entire DNA on a 
single CD, which is a dream that testifies to the wish to reduce the meaning of life – and of our 
entire identity – to the sequences of our basic genetic units (Fox Keller 2000, 6). The ‘facile 
genetic reductionism’ (Sarkar 2006, 86) that characterises this approach of genetic 
determination was seriously challenged by the publication of the results of the Human Genome 
Project (between 2003 and 2006), which aimed to decipher and map the total number of genes 
in the human genome. According to the results of the Project, there are far too few genes in the 
human genome to explain the vast amount of human organic traits, which hints at the more 
complex processes that are apparently going on in the interaction of genes, proteins and organic 
development. Some scientists and scientific commentators were consequently quick to argue 
that the Central Dogma was finally clearly disproven. However, a more thorough analysis of 
contemporary scientific and non-scientific discourses around the concept of the gene reveals 
that there are full of tensions, discontinuities and outright contradictions. The notion of ‘the 
gene’ (or nowadays alternatively the entire ‘genome’) as central carrier of the information of 
life, including the popular metaphors of the genetic ‘code’, ‘blueprint’, or ‘book of life’, have 
largely remained unchanged (Carolan 2008, 757). Consequently, it is not surprising that 
biologists who belong to a different school of thought - sometimes called ‘developmentalism’ – 
which has opposed and has been marginalised by the dominant gene-centric school of thought 
for decades, have taken the results of the Human Genome Project as confirmation of their own, 
competing, complexity science-based theory. According to their argument, ‘[t]he cause of 
development…is the relationship of the components, not the components themselves’, which 
implies that development is emergent and causality rarely linear or straightforward (Gilbert 
Gottlieb quoted in Hood et al. 2010, 4).  
 
The struggle over GMO represents a challenge to those scholars of biopolitics who argue that 
complexity science is definitive of a mode of reason informing neoliberal governmental 
regimes.  The GMO controversy illustrates where this integration meets its limits. The biotech 
industry, as indeed any industry in a modern market economy, crucially relies on the 
manufacturing, patenting and trading of ‘products’, in this case the product of ‘the gene’ 
(Ansems de Vries and Rosenow 2015; Rosenow 2012, 534). Contrary to complexity science, 
which emphasises relationality and the blurring of boundaries, tradeable products need to have 
discrete recognisable properties and clear boundaries; they need to be clearly identifiable, 
differentiable and representable. The ‘industrial gene’ needs to be ‘defined, owned, tracked, 
proven acceptably safe, [and] proven to have uniform effect’ (Caruso 2007), and the possibility 
of this would be thrown into doubt if the notion of a stringent cause-and-effect relation between 
gene and organism were to be abandoned. If the concept of the gene as entity and central agent 
in the development of organisms were given up, the industry would not be able to sustain itself. 
This might, indeed, explain the lack of impact that complexity science related developments in 
the life sciences have had so far on the biotech industry and on its governmental regulation 
(Caruso 2007; cf. Rosenow 2012, 534). 
 
For developmentalist biologists, such as Mae-Wan Ho, complexity science challenges not only 
the notion of clear-cut entities, but also the traditional hierarchy between the scientist as subject 
and the scientific object (see also Coleman 2015b; Coleman and Rosenow forthcoming). Ho 
argues (1993, 100) that the role of the cell or even the organism as a whole needs to be 
upgraded, as it is more than merely the sum of its parts. Indeed, the scientist needs to 
understand her/himself as being informed by the organism, which should be allowed ‘to tell its 
own story…to inform us of its internal processes’ (Ho 1993, 100). Ho draws on quantum 
theory, frames objects such as particles not as pre-given, but as only becoming visible in their 
interaction with scientific instruments. In other words, the object is altered when scientifically 
manipulated and can only produce the effect that brings it into existence in this interaction 
(Castelao-Lawless 1995, 50). Ho concludes (1993, 142) that ‘the subjectivist-objectivist 
dichotomy is falsely drawn’ and that subjectivity is indeed an ‘anthropomorphic-
anthropocentric concept’ that results from human chauvinism. The effort to dissolve the subject-
object-distinction is one of the key motivations for Ho’s opposition to genetic engineering, as 
this technology is based on the notion that the scientist as subject is in clear control of her/his 
recognition of and interference with the object. As many anti-GMO activists emphasise (Ho 
1998, 71, 135), genetic engineering overlooks how the organism is an ‘active, autonomous 
being, which is open to the environment’, and whose integrity and autonomy is violated by its 
genetic modification. Such an understanding is disregarded in mainstream molecular biology 
because recognising the organism as an actor that can transform in unforeseeable ways would 
threaten the status quo. 
 
Engaging with this controversy prompts us to seek resistant politics elsewhere from those who 
legislate for environmental politics through the lens of biopolitical sociologies of (neo)liberal 
regimes.  Engaging with anti-GMO struggles, we do not only find compelling contestation in 
the practices of environmental activists who use apocalyptic imaginaries of catastrophe and who 
rely on scientific ‘truth’ and concepts of nature as ‘one’.  In this example, the ‘knowledge’ that 
scholars of biopolitics identify as the one that dominates neoliberal governmental regimes – 
complexity science – is precisely that mobilised in order to contest the commodification of 
nature.  We might also draw parallels here with other knowledges mobilised in contestation of 
such commodification.  For many rural populations in Colombia, the environmental catastrophe 
has already happened. ‘Natural resource’ extraction in the context of neoliberalisation of the 
economic model has taken place through widespread massacres and forced displacement at the 
hands of state-linked paramilitaries whose close cooperation with both the official state forces 
and multinational corporations has been extensively documented. Social organisations 
contesting the development paradigm, and the associated commodification of peasant and 
indigenous lands, mobilise critiques of the epistemic violence of notions of the sovereign 
subject in dominion over a nature that can be predicted and controlled as external matter. These 
struggles have been denoted planes de vida (plans of/for life). Under the influence of 
indigenous cosmovisions, life itself has been redefined in terms of ‘a dynamic equilibrium 
between the physical, the biological and the human’ and a critique of linear temporalities 
imposed by capitalist modernity (Coleman 2015a).  These mobilisations in defence of territory, 
moreover, do not take land (tierra) as an external object or assume a relation to it as property. 
Rather, the notion of territory is developed and redefined in a process of understanding the 
complex forces which threaten a certain relationship with the land, understood not as object but 
as an organic part of experience (Coleman 2015b).  Like with the Zapatistas in Chiapas, land 
‘itself is a rebel’, known in ways incommensurable with a commodity fetishism which vacates 
not only social relations (as Marx would have it) but the being of the land itself.  It is a fetishism 
of ‘those who sell and buy the land as if the land was not [had no being] and as if the colour of 
the land that we are was non-existent’ (Subcomandante Marcos, quoted in Vásquez 2011, 37). 
Land here is irreducible to an object, or even a thing. Land (tierra) ‘exceeds the modern limit of 
reality in presence’ – not only due to this sense of organic unity but because ‘it implies the past, 
heritage, memory. Tierra has to be defended … for the sake of protecting the ancestors, of 
preserving an origin that is both past and always, already present’ (Vázquez 2011, 37-8). 
 
A word of caution is required here. We too need to be careful about binaries.  It would be a 
mistake indeed to seek to appropriate this epistemic terrain into the domain of complexity 
science. There are overlaps, indeed, in the divergence from modern metaphysics evident in 
quantum physics and the ontologies of microbiology inspired by complexity theory. But the 
irreducible dissonance in notions of space-time, memory and life itself is something to be 
tarried with rather than dissolved (Coleman 2015b). Indeed, this dissonance itself might prompt 
a certain hesitancy in declaring the radical challenge that complexity science-based notions of 
life might pose to relentless commodification of nature. That commodificataion invokes an 
understanding of life as being about control and predictability, and a separation of subject and 
object, does not entail that resistance is automatically found in a readymade opposite move. 
This, once again, harbours the danger of falling into the either…or trap. Rather than legislating 
for resistance, we need to engage where struggle is actually taking place and only from this 
uncertain, in-between space, interrogate its politics.  Avoiding the legislative either … or also 
puts us on guard against another potential appropriation, that of forcing struggles over life back 
into the ontopolitical matrix toward the pole of attunement with nature: the idea that nature is, in 
itself, harmonious, such that it may be even better without human disturbance.  
 
Movements struggling over life and territory in Colombia do indeed emphasis harmony with 
nature, but notions of time, memory, the ghosts of pasts generations permeating the very being 
of the land, give a humanistic aspect to their struggle that can no more be evaded than it can be 
reduced to the coercive monologism of the sovereign subject (Coleman 2015a). So too, Ho’s 
critique of genetic engineering rests on an understanding of life that emphasises its telos of 
harmony and order (Ansems de Vries and Rosenow 2015), while publications of other anti-
GMO activists, such as Jeremy Rifkin, also make exhaustive use of notions such as the 
‘integrity of natural kinds’ and the ‘natural telos of the self-defining purpose of all life forms’ 
(quoted in Haraway 1997, 60). Nonetheless, the undermining of the subject-object distinction 
and sovereign subject of knowledge means that we cannot map this epistemic territory neatly 
onto Connolly’s late modern matrix.    
 
While critics of GMO, such as Ho, do not simply turn the magnetic needle of the ontopolitical 
matrix in the other direction, this does not imply that we should enthusiastically endorse her 
frame as simply other to the domination and commodification of nature. Maria Hynes notes 
(2014, 1934) that biologists often make use of aesthetic metaphors to highlight the relevance of 
their work, metaphors that often occlude unacknowledged metaphysical assumptions. Ho (1998, 
76), for example, speaks of life as a ‘vibrant world of colour and form, of light and music’, 
contradicting the dull, mechanical view that is supposedly dominant in mainstream biology. The 
implicit metaphysics is related to holism, which forward ‘romantic aesthetic values’ that 
emphasise the beauty of complexity and diversity, and express a longing for coherence, purity, 
harmony and perfection (Hynes 2014, 1935). Although she aims to downplay herself as subject 
who ‘knows’ about life, Ho thereby ends up enclosing the frame, making her research largely 
about the search for exemplars, inhibiting any perspective that might unsettle it from outside 
(Hynes 2014, 1935). What is invoked is what Gilles Deleuze (2004, 64) calls the ‘beautiful 
soul’, which regards differences as ‘respectable, reconcilable or federative’ and allows for 
absolute notions of the whole that exclude everything that does not fit (cf. Ansems de Vries and 
Rosenow 2015). Indeed, Ho’s account is vulnerable to a problematic political extension, 
grounding her understanding of the ideal societal and political order. In line with complexity 
science, Ho contests the traditional boundary that distinguishes ways of understanding nature 
from ways of understanding society, and argues that if knowledge of how organic system work 
were taken seriously, it would be used to guide us in how we think we should organise societies. 
For her (1998, 273), radical democracy is the best way to organise societies, because, like 
nature, democratic systems are characterised by inter-communication, reconciliation, and the 
distribution of control – the ‘beautiful soul’ all over again. Democracy, for Ho, is the most 
‘natural’ form of both environmental and social organisation (cf. Ho 2010, 65-7). Similarly, 
Stuart Kauffman (1995, 5, 28), one of the most distinguished and well-known complexity 
scientists in the popular realm, argues that ‘the idea of a pluralistic democratic society’ is not to 
be thought of as simply a human creation,  but, rather, it is ‘part of the natural order of things’. 
In his account of life, Kauffman (1995, 28) identifies ‘hints of an apologia for a pluralistic 
society as the natural design for adaptive compromise’ (cf. Ansems de Vries and Rosenow 
2015). 
 
The comparison between ‘natural’ and ‘democratic’ social systems reveals that both do not exist 
on equal footing, but that the ‘truth’ of the former is to be used as a levelling board for the 
latter. Ho’s and Kauffman’s effort to use the same criteria for organising both society and 
nature is implicitly based on hierarchically distinguishing the latter from the former: society has 
to ‘learn’ from nature, the ‘natural’ is primary- the producer of ‘true’ living- while society 
becomes nature’s dualistic, inferior ‘Other’. The (scientific) truth of nature as a harmonious 
democratic system is supposed to undermine less democratic forms of societal organisation, 
providing for example justification for Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ of ‘rogue states’. This is potentially 
more dangerous (in terms of a potential elimination of ‘undemocratic’ forms of life) than 
traditional political contestations of perceived democratic gaps, because ‘truth’ that is grounded 
in nature has few grounds to be challenged upon (Ansems de Vries and Rosenow 2015). Not 
quite attunement, but enclosure nonetheless – and one with potential to occlude or delegitimise 
struggles conceived outside of this frame. 
 
The struggles over life in Colombia are more fluid and more riven with internal contractions. 
This is, in part, related to an element of self-critique about exclusions and violences at play 
within them. Self-critique has, for example, taken place around gendered hierarchies which 
privilege certain voices (Coleman 2015b). So too have activists within these processes sought to 
undermine their own reiteration of the very ‘logic of war’ they confront through resistance, ‘a 
logic that annuls, that marginalizes, that tells the other “not you”’ (cited in Coleman 2015a). 
The porous boundaries of political critique are also the result of the ‘diagnostic’ nature of the 
enterprise.  Problems are not given in advance, or read off an abstract theory of capitalism or 
colonialism (except in the form, perhaps, of a ‘preliminary protocol’ – cf. Coleman and 
Rosenow forthcoming). Rather, analyses of the power relations confronted are forged and 
rethought as the sketched contours of political subjectivity, filled with content in the process of 
struggle (Coleman 2015b). Here, the frames at play have cracked edges from the start. 
Something outside the frame is perpetually sought, glimpsed, or allowed to enter to unsettle 
given ways of knowing power and resistance (cf. Coleman 2015a). This very troubling of 
cognition, of presence, must itself caution us against a romantic vision of other epistemic 
terrains. Even less should we be tempted to appropriate such terrains into a singular economy of 
truth as a secure and certain ground for critique. To begin with, the self-critique to be found in 
such processes testifies to relations of domination also at play within struggles (such as the 
power relations constituted around questions of gender). However, engagement with such 
processes also forces recognition of the violence of any attempt at appropriation of knowledges 
emergent from convergence with other cosmo-visions.  Not only does ‘land’ (tierra) itself 
exceeds cognition, and resist incorporation into a modern metaphysics of presence and of the 
present ‘as the sole locus of the real’ (Vazquez 2011, 38). So too, the very notion of language, 
of the word, draws its credibility from those in a past that unsettles presence, from an in-
between that defies appropriation and translation into modern metaphysics (Vazquez 2011, 38; 
cf. Coleman 2015a). 
Conclusion 
Starting from struggle, with partisan commitment, does not imply adopting wholesale the 
arguments and perspectives advanced within those struggles. The example of anti-GMO 
activism, in particular, illustrates the close connection that exists between the opening of new 
spaces for radical political thought and action and the adherence to traditional, dominant ways. 
Moreover, as the discussion of struggles over land commodification has highlighted, there may 
be a violence in the very attempt at appropriation, in our own attempts to insert struggles back 
into what can be said, fixed, rendered present as an objection of cognition. To understand 
solidarity and partisanship as mere embrace of arguments and practices to be found in struggle 
would be misleading and omits the importance of a back and forth between ontological 
investment and (self-)critique, the demand that we linger in the gaps between knowledges and 
epistemologies (Coleman 2015b; Coleman and Rosenow 2016; forthcoming). It is only by 
living with the gaps, by perpetually performing the double move –oscillating between critical 
analysis and ontological investment – that partisan solidarity can be critically practiced. The 
oppositional potential of the different notions of life and nature that we have identified in 
arguments forwarded by developmentalist biologists does not lie in an embrace of attunement – 
which is the opposite pole of mastery – but in the way it provides us with a resource for further 
exploration in the double move. Likewise, the challenge to given understandings of life and 
land enacted by social movements influenced by indigenous cosmovisions, do not provide us 
with resources to be exactracted from context. The very evanescence and indeterminacy of 
these struggles, their irreducibility to presence, to be fixed within the terms of available 
categories, can prompt something similar to what Foucault (1994) called an ‘ethic of 
discomfort’ that incites a perpetual shifting of our ontological ground. This movement is literal 
insofar that it can never rest, it is never linear, and can never follow the easy path outlined by 
pre-given problems. It does not enable us to be ever certain about the problem of our time (as 
the biopolitics literature often is). The exposure to something that cannot be grasped by the 
categories we possess points to the need for a constant working at our conceptual limits. 
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